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DEVELOPMENTS AFTER BUCHAREST

1. In the three months following Bucharest, the dispute continued unresolved, and indeed, there was no serious attempt to resolve it. Each side continued to argue the merits of its respective position; each continued its effort to get support within the world movement. The Soviets sent a series of letters to the Chinese criticizing Chinese propaganda activities and putting the Chinese on notice that Soviet technicians would be withdrawn during August. The Chinese replied to these letters and, on 10 September, produced a comprehensive rebuttal of the charges which the Soviets had made in the circular letter of 21 June. The contents of the Chinese letter of 10 September were made known to some foreign Communist leaders, just as the Soviets had done with their 21 June circular. As of mid-September, leading circles throughout the international movement were well aware of the gravity of the dispute and many were disturbed by the prospects of an international meeting, scheduled for 9 November in Moscow, at which they would be called upon to commit themselves.

2. The developments during these three months will be treated chronologically and in summary form.

JUNE

3. On 29 June both Pravda and the Peiping Peoples Daily carried editorials on the Bucharest communique that made it abundantly clear that

both Parties remained firm in their divergent views. Neither of the articles criticized the opponent, but the "principled" Statements of position were clearly divergent.

4. Pravda falsely claimed that in signing the communique the entire Bloc had endorsed the 1957 "Peace Manifesto" as well as the Moscow Declaration and that the entire Communist movement had recognized "the correctness of the theses of the Declaration and Manifesto." The article was clearly intended to create the impression that the CPSU had the full support of the world movement.

5. Peoples Daily disposed of the communique briefly, using it mainly as a peg for a lengthy presentation of the correctness of the Chinese interpretation of the Moscow Declaration, with emphasis on "revisionism" as the "main danger".

6. In late June, representatives of the French, Italian, and Danish CPs were briefed in Moscow on how to handle the dispute.

JULY

7. During July the CPSU took action against Chinese propaganda activities in the USSR, arranged to withdraw Soviet technicians from China, reasserted the fundamentals of the Soviet position, and adopted a resolution which formally endorsed Khrushchev's actions at Bucharest while sharply attacking Chinese views.

8. The CCP leadership apparently held a long conference during the month. It is believed that the Chinese decided to withdraw temporarily from open disputation, to concentrate on strengthening domestic controls in order to counter Soviet pressures, and, in preparation for a resumption of open debate, to exert pressures on the international movement.

9. On 6 July, the CPSU informed the CCP that, in carrying two offensive editorials, the Chinese Russian-language journal Druzba had violated an agreement that neither country should publish articles against the other. The two articles were characterized against Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration. The Soviets told the Chinese that the Soviet publication in Peking was being stopped and they asked that Druzba also be stopped.*

10. Kommunist No. 10, signed to the press 11 July 1960, carried an important article by F. Konstantinov and K. Momdzhyan, who proceeded to uphold the CPSU positions and refute the Chinese arguments on the basis of "revolutionary dialectics" and "Creative Marxism". "Only doctrinaires, and not revolutionaries" could fail to understand the significance of peaceful

* In addition to suspending the distribution of Druzba, the Chinese illustrated periodical Kitai was dropped for at least two issues. It is not known whether or not this was also mentioned in the 6 July letter.

coexistence in the "changed conditions" of today, they said. Those who argue (as the Chinese have) that coexistence "could disarm the peoples ideologically and demobilize them" are guilty of a "blunder". Those who deny the possibility of "peaceful transition" (as the Chinese have tended to do) are guilty of "misleading" some CPs. "They can only drag these parties to the positions of sectarianism and dogmatism". Anyone who acts to create disunity in the Bloc, the authors charged, are "willy, or nilly" working against the "success of the struggle for peace and socialism...the sacred duty" of all Communists.

11. On 12 July the Central Committee of the CPSU convened in plenary session and in its final resolution, dated 16 July, went far beyond a mere criticism of left-wing dogmatism. The resolution gave unusually heavy emphasis ^{to} of the CPSU's approval of the conduct of the Soviet delegation to Bucharest, and it actually distorted the Bucharest communique to make it appear that it ^{formally endorsed the thesis of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses and} had included denunciation of "narrow nationalism". ^{that it had} For the first time, the Central Committee formally characterized views ^{as "deviations" such} such as those held by the Chinese, ~~as "deviations"~~.

12. The strong commitment by the Central Committee to the Khrushchev line at Bucharest reflected new, disturbing developments in Sino-Soviet relations during the two weeks following Bucharest. Military

relationships snagged, and the matter of the Soviet technicians was reaching a critical stage.

13. A Soviet military mission dispatched to China after Bucharest to conclude certain defense arrangements reportedly found that the Chinese had abruptly decided that they, and not the Russians, should control the facilities in question. A CPSU foreign section official told a leading Free World Communist in July that problems had arisen from Chinese demands for modern (presumably atomic) weapons.

14. On 21 July the CPSU sent a letter to the CCP complaining about the Chinese attitude toward Soviet technicians. According to the CPSU, the withdrawal of Soviet technicians for work at home had been requested at the end of 1956 (and/or early in 1957), on the ground that local technicians had been trained. The other Bloc countries agreed to this, but the Chinese did not. Again, when the Chinese complained about the behavior of some technicians in August 1958, the Soviets had considered their withdrawal, but the Chinese demurred. Recently, the CPSU letter charged, the Chinese had added to their disrespectful treatment of the technicians by circulating "anti-Marxist" literature among them in an effort to subvert them. The Chinese pamphlet entitled "Long Live Leninism", containing three April ideological refutations of the Soviet line, was cited as an example of the type of subversive literature being used by the Chinese.

15. In a letter dated 25 July, without waiting for a reply from Peking, the CPSU served notice that all Soviet technicians would be withdrawn during the period 28 July - 1 September.

16. Less is known of Chinese activities during the month of July. "Long Live Leninism" was widely distributed abroad in an effort to publicize the Chinese views within the world movement. A theoretical journal (Hsiang River Critic), which had played a key role during the period in the 1920's and 30's when Mao was opposing Soviet influence on Chinese Communism, was revived in the middle of July. Liu Ning-i, leading a delegation to Japan at the end of July, subsequently demonstrated by his actions in Japan the content of the hard Chinese line in foreign policy. The Chinese leadership, apparently in extended conference from 2 July to 22 July, prepared its answers to the CPSU letters, and it seems likely that the Chinese were then in favor of conciliating the Soviets as much as possible without, however, retreating from ~~principled~~ ^{of principle} positions.

AUGUST

17. Relations continued to worsen during August. The month opened with a Chinese letter (or possibly, two separate letters) dealing with the technicians and the question of publications. Later, the Chinese leadership appears again to have met and probably ^{to have} decided to take a harder

position against Soviet pressures. In mid-August the Chinese began again to participate in the open disputation. The CPSU continued to publish articles attacking Chinese positions and employed the Bulgarian Party leader to push pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese theses in the international Communist journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism. A "conciliatory" letter was sent to the CCP on 20 August, but late in the month the CPSU was circulating to foreign CPs a revised and strengthened version of the 21 June letter, which had been shown to foreign CP delegations at Bucharest.

18. In a letter (or letters) dated 1 August, ^{the} the Chinese answered the CPSU letters of July regarding the publications and technicians.

19. The Chinese said that, although the CPSU publication in Peking ~~had been writing objectionable pieces~~ ^{printing} since September 1959, they had not demanded a stoppage, on the ground that they trusted their own cadres to be able to determine right from wrong. The Chinese pointed out that the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was permitted to distribute Amerika in 50,000 copies and suggested that it was "curious" that the U.S. should be able to publicize the "American way of life" and "imperialism", while the CCP should be criticized for publishing articles against "imperialism". The Chinese acknowledged that they must accede to Soviet insistence, ^{the} but requested reconsideration.

20. Concerning the Soviet technicians, the Chinese refuted the

CPSU charges. In 1958 the CCP had asked that the technicians be called "technical experts" rather than "advisers". This had been agreed to. The CCP had only complained about a few technicians, and this had been settled. It was not true that the advice of the technicians had been "demonstratively burnt" as the CPSU had charged; the advice had been accepted in the main. The technicians themselves had asked for Chinese literature at the very beginning, and it was not unusual that they had attended occasional lectures. The distribution of "Long Live Leninism" was not exceptionable: the technicians had not been forced to discuss it.

21. The Chinese said that if the Soviets continued to object to these practices, ^{they} this could be discussed; but the CCP did strongly object to the unilateral Soviet action as wrong, legally, morally, and politically. It constituted a violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty of Friendship. It would damage the Chinese construction program, create difficulties, weaken the Bloc, and encourage the "imperialists".

22. An Orientalists Congress, which had been long and widely-heralded by the Soviets and at which Sinology had been given high booking, opened in Moscow on 9 August--without the Chinese. Their withdrawal, without explanation, and with lame explanation by the Soviets, was probably intended to demonstrate disapproval of "opportunist" Soviet efforts to attract participants from the West.

23. Another meeting of the Chinese leadership appears to have been held between 2 and 13 August. No details are available.

24. In mid-August, Problems of Peace and Socialism carried an article by Bulgarian Party chief Todor Zhivkov, who had signally supported Khrushchev at Bucharest. Zhivkov's defense of Khrushchev's peace strategy as both necessary and feasible followed the line previously enunciated by Khrushchev, Gomulka, Novotny, and Togliatti, and indicated that the CPSU was beginning to step up its use of Problems of Peace and Socialism as a weapon in the dispute.

25. Li Fu-ch'un, Politburo member and Chairman of the State Planning Commission, reopened the Chinese campaign in the overt debate. His 16 August article in Red Flag (like the April "Long Live Leninism" article) was published in English in Peking Review, 23 August. He charged that the "modern revisionists" who had been trying to isolate China since 1958, would only isolate themselves (as the CCP had said privately to the CPSU in late 1959 or early 1960). In mid-month, Li led a strong Chinese delegation to Habana for the Cuban Party congress, where he concentrated on lobbying among foreign delegates to line them up against the "modern revisionists".

26. Also in mid-August, a speech by Li Wei-han asserted that the Chinese were the only correct interpreters of Leninism: "The Mao Tse-tung

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ideology is Marxism-Leninism in its fullest developed form in the era of socialist revolution by the proletariat." Characteristically, the speech added a second major thesis reminiscent of 1949: "Armed struggle ^{le} is the principle form of waging the revolution." It is of considerable significance that this speech was not published until ²⁴ ~~21~~ September, by which time the CCP had definitely decided upon a much more intransigent attitude toward the CPSU.

27. Meanwhile, the CPSU in mid-August was continuing to elaborate its ideological position. Following an important article by Frantssev in Pravda of 7 August against a "rebirth of views similar to those of the left-wing Communists", a leading spokesman for the foreign section of the Party, B. N. Ponomarev, declared in Pravda that peaceful coexistence was "nothing else but a higher form of class struggle." On 16 August, an article by S. Titarenko, who had in earlier August articles come close to it, explicitly singled out the Chinese for warning against the dangers of "isolation."

28. Almost coincidentally, on 16 August Li Fu-ch'un wrote in Red Flag about the need for the Chinese to "rely mainly on our own efforts".

29. On 20 August the CPSU sent what was described by a high Soviet official as a "conciliatory" letter to the CCP. Nothing is known about this letter, or why the spokesman considered it "conciliatory".

Other very good evidence suggests that the Chinese saw nothing very "conciliatory" in the Soviet actions.

30. On 26 August, the leading CPSU expert on Communist tactics in underdeveloped countries, Ye. Zhukov, wrote in Pravda on "Some Questions of the Contemporary National Liberation Movement." This was a sharp rebuttal of Chinese hostility toward "bourgeois nationalists", which "haughty attitude", Zhukov said, constituted "sectarianism of the most dangerous kind."

31. Late in August, it appeared that the CPSU had circulated among the Free World CPS a revised and strengthened version of the 21 June circular which had been shown to delegates at Bucharest. The CPSU seems to have told the recipients that they would now have sufficient time to digest the Soviet charges to reach clear-cut decisions prior to the scheduled meeting in Moscow in November. The letter emphasized that the CPSU intended to seek clarification and to reach a clear agreement with the CCP: ^{purpose} this may have had something to do with the "conciliatory" letter of 20 August.

SEPTEMBER

32. Chinese determination to stand firm on its positions was demonstrated by statements in the Chinese press and at the Vietnamese Party Congress, and was communicated to the CPSU in the Chinese letter

of 10 September. Soviet statements during the first half of the month indicated that Moscow was also not prepared to retreat.

33. On 4 September the Chinese belatedly published the full text of a speech delivered on 22 July to the Chinese Writers Congress. The speech included a direct attack on the concept of "socialist humanism", which is a central theme in both the domestic and foreign programs of the CPSU.

34. The following day, Li Fu-ch'un, who headed the Chinese delegation to the Vietnamese congress, delivered a speech reasserting the correctness of the basic Chinese positions. The response of the leading Soviet delegate N. A. Mu'hitdinov on 11 September was a violent attack

on the Chinese. *for trying to sell their erroneous views... and force them on others.*
THE CHINESE LETTER OF 10 SEPTEMBER 1960

35. By far the most important development, ^{describing the dispute} ~~however~~, was the 10 September CCP letter to the CPSU, which was outlined by the Chinese for the benefit of foreign CPs in continuation of the Chinese effort to enlist their sympathy. *(said to be 160 pages long)* The letter is organized on a pattern similar to that of the 21 June CPSU circular for the purpose of countering each of the charges in that circular.

36. Chinese views on the background of the current dispute. It was not true, as the CPSU had alleged, that the CCP had agreed with the CPSU in the past and had only recently diverged from the CPSU. Actually, the

letter stated, the differences began at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, when the CPSU wrongfully struck off Stalin's "positive role" without ^{*} prior discussion with the fraternal parties, and when the CPSU put forward an erroneous theory of "peaceful transition", also without consulting the other CPs. The CCP had registered its objection to these CPSU actions, both in principle and in the unilateral way they had been taken.

37. In October 1956, the Chinese letter stated, the CPSU had mobilized armed forces against Poland and the CCP had objected. The Soviets eventually agreed with the Chinese. The CPSU had wanted the fraternal CPs (apparently in a joint meeting) to condemn the Polish Party, but the CCP had advised the Soviets that the parties should individually advise the Poles. Again, the CCP letter states, the CPSU eventually agreed.

38. In the case of the Hungarian uprising, the Chinese had again been obliged to intervene with the Soviets to get them to crush the uprising by force. The Soviets had at first been determined to withdraw their forces from Hungary.

39. At the 1957 Moscow conference of CPs, the CCP had been instrumental in forcing significant revisions in the first draft of the Moscow

** In this account, excerpts set off in quotation marks are actually taken from summary versions of the letter, and do not necessarily reflect the exact wording of the original letter.*

Declaration. The first draft had said nothing about the subject of state power or class struggle, but rather had outlined a purely "parliamentary path" for "transition". The CCP had sent a letter ^{of objection;} ~~objecting to this,~~ but, in order to save the "prestige" of the CPSU, had agreed that the Declaration should show a link between the formulations contained in the Declaration and the 20th CPSU Congress theses.*

40. At the Moscow conference, Mao had carefully specified that the CPSU should "lead" the Bloc.** ^{preminence} This carries with it the responsibilities of leadership, the 10 September letter stated, and the CPSU should discuss matters with the other CPs on an equal basis.

41. The CCP letter, in refuting Soviet charges to the contrary, asserted that the CCP had not discussed these differences with other CPs.

42. The Chinese declared that the CPSU had gradually deviated from the Moscow Declaration and had gone back to the "wrong theses" of the 20th CPSU Congress. Khrushchev, especially, was guilty of this from September 1959, and of open criticism of the CCP and its leaders.

* A key symbol of the current dispute is the consistent Chinese avoidance of the theses of the 20th and 21st CPSU Congresses in their affirmations of the Moscow Declaration.

** The CCP and the Albanian CP have employed the term "led", rather than "headed", referring to the CPSU position within the Bloc, advisedly. The other East European satellites in general use the Soviet formula "Camp headed by the CPSU".

The letter cited numerous examples of the incorrect CPSU attitude:

back to?
allegations that the Chinese want to maintain the cold war, characterization of the Sino-Indian border dispute as "foolish and stupid"; insinuation that (Mao, presumably) "an old man like one of a pair of galoshes can be kept in a corner to be admired"; "testing stability of capitalism by arms"; Khrushchev's friendly characterizations of Eisenhower and about "1960-- a new era"; talk about banishing war; etc. Kuusinen's Lenin day article did not even mention the Moscow Declaration--which shows how far the CPSU has departed from it, the Chinese claim. Even if Khrushchev says that no names have been mentioned in these statements, it is clear to everyone who is meant.

43. The CCP letter defended the Chinese actions at the WFTU meeting in Peking in June 1960 and pointed out the inconsistency of the Soviet position: it is correct for the CPSU to attack the CCP in the presence of non-Communists and "imperialist reporters at Warsaw and Bucharest", but wrong for the Chinese to call a meeting of leading Communists at Peking. Furthermore, the CCP letter reveals the main point of the Chinese objection to the Saillant report (written with the help of a Soviet comrade, the letter states) to the WFTU meeting: the report mentioned the free world without quotation marks, whereas communes and the Leap Forward were put in quotation marks. This constituted an open criticism of the CCP's policy.

a teacher?

44. According to the 10 September Chinese letter, the CPSU had sent a letter to the CCP on 2 June calling for an international meeting to resolve the differences. The CCP had agreed ~~to this~~ but asked for time to prepare itself. Then, on 7 June, the CPSU suggested that there be held at Bucharest a preliminary conference to discuss tactics following the collapse of the Summit. The CPSU assured the CCP that no resolution would be adopted at this meeting. Again, the Chinese agreed. But at Bucharest, Khrushchev surprised the Chinese by launching a full scale attack on their positions for which they were not prepared. Instead of an attack on "imperialism", as the CPSU had proposed, the discussion was diverted to a "harmful and disruptive" attack on the CCP. After Bucharest, a press campaign was launched against the Chinese. The CCP letter criticized the CPSU for rashness and said that the latter seemed not to have understood how much this had damaged Soviet prestige as the leader of the "camp". The letter then took up the basic questions raised in the CPSU circular of 21 June.

45. "Present Epoch". The CCP letter reasserted the correctness of its assessment of the present balance of forces and its interpretation of this shift as meaning "greater opportunities for struggles for Socialism, for national liberation, for peace, to expand and to succeed." Khrushchev's

views on the significance of the shift (which Mao recognized as early as 1949) are erroneous. The CPSU and Khrushchev have deviated from the Moscow Declaration in talking about "banishing war for ever", "world without arms and weapons", "export of capital helping the development of colonial people", local wars leading "inevitably to world war", etc. The CPSU, by "attaching exclusive importance to discussions with imperialist statesmen", promotes the "personality cult." These views harm the "liberation struggle". Khrushchev overestimates the weakening of "imperialism" and his views are "subjective", "idealist", and "left".

46. "War and peace". The CCP letter challenged the CPSU attitudes toward this question. The CPSU has turned the slogan "war is not fatalistically inevitable" into "war is fatalistically avoidable". The CPSU "always hesitates" to support "liberation struggles" and "even opposes" them. Of all the "props" for maintaining peace cited in the Moscow Declaration, the strength of the camp is the most important, but the CPSU is weakening the camp by withdrawing technicians. The letter justified Mao's "paper tiger" thesis by quoting Lenin to the effect that "Anglo-French imperialism has feet of clay". The well-known Chinese emphasis on "vigilance" and "struggle" was reiterated and the letter argued that not the Chinese, but the Soviet argument about the "destruction of mankind" from nuclear war "is to create panic and lead to surrender and blackmail."

47. "Peaceful Coexistence". In this section the Chinese letter

conceded that negotiating with "imperialists" may be necessary^{g.d.} but

objected to anything that would "beautify and prettify them." It might

also be necessary to compromise, but the Chinese would trust more in

Sept 1955? the efficacy "expouse and mass struggles" than in the "good wishes" of

the "imperialists." The letter held out for what the 21st June CPSU

circular had called a "third way": "world war can and must be avoided,

but the alternative may not be peaceful coexistence . It may be something

like what obtains at present, call it cold war or anything you like." The

letter objected to specific Soviet formulations, such as calling peaceful

coexistence "the highest form of class struggle"* and saying that the

"upsurge of liberation struggles is the result of coexistence".** It said

that Zhivkov had carried this (false) line of reasoning further in saying that

"coexistence is the road to socialism."*** The Chinese attitude toward

bourgeois nationalists was reaffirmed.

48. "Peaceful transition". Here the Chinese claimed that the CPSU had taken a "one-sided" view, had sought ^{to} in the first draft of the Moscow Declaration to "evade" the hard facts of "state power, class struggle, dictatorship, smashing the state machinery", and ~~was~~ ^{had been} guilty of turning "Leninism into bourgeois humanism." The question of "peaceful transition" must not be confused with the "parliamentary path": "we should have no illusion about the possibilities of bringing about structural changes through Parliament."

49. "Tactics in the International Mass Organizations". The CCP letter defended the Chinese attitude toward the international fronts: they should be "fighting organizations"; they must fight "imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism", they must "support unequivocally all national liberation struggles" and "democratic struggles inside capitalist countries"; they must be "flexible" and not merely rubber-stamp Bloc policies. But the Soviets were "all along opposed to support by national liberation struggles by the World Peace Council" and the International Union of Students "nearly got liquidated due to Soviet insistence on the merger of reactionary students' organizations."

50. "Revisionism and Dogmatism". The Chinese letter reaffirmed the Moscow Declaration assertion that "internationally revisionism is the main danger"; rebuked the CPSU for holding that "revisionism has already

been smashed' ". It sought to turn around the Soviet attack on "dogmatism" by pointing out that it was "dogmatic" to attack such "concrete applications" of Marxism as the Communes and Great Leap Forward.

51. "International Solidarity" Finally, the 10 September letter returned to the CCP's views on the way the CPSU should conduct itself as the "leader" of Communist "Camp". The relationship must be on a basis of equality and responsibility. The CPSU violated this ^{principle} when it said that "all the fifty parties at Bucharest supported us." This ^{assertion} was not true, the Chinese said: some CP had taken different positions. Also, it was "unfortunate" that the CPSU had raised the dispute to the level of state relations in the matter of the technicians. The letter expressed the Chinese conviction that "Socialist unity is basic, while the differences are temporary." As for the November meeting in Moscow, the Chinese believed that it would be a good thing if there could be an agreement, but they feared that one meeting might not be sufficient. Meanwhile, they would continue to emphasize issues on which agreement existed, while continuing to discuss unresolved differences.

52. Following the issuance of the 10 September CCP letter, the last development to be accounted for in this survey is the publication in mid-September of two Soviet-inspired articles in Problems of Peace and Socialism.

These articles, by Leon Bohr and Jean Dienne, further develop the validity of the Soviet argumentation and present a number of the anti-Chinese charges. Neither writer has been identified. The names may well be pseudonyms, and the CPSU's "use of functionaries" to conceal its hand is interesting in view of the fact that it had accused the CCP of using this same device earlier.

THE BLOC PARTIES

53. In the first three weeks after Bucharest (i.e., prior to the CPSU plenum), the Soviet effort to get full support for their positions on the part of the other Bloc parties met with mixed success. The CPSU plenum of mid-July stimulated further developments in this direction.

54. By mid-September the following Bloc parties were on record as formally committed to the Soviet side on the issues in dispute: Hungarian (29 June), Bulgarian (13 July), East German (24 July), Rumanian (1 August), *Polish (13 September)*, North Korean (11 August). In addition, ~~Gomulka of Poland~~ and Novotny of Czechoslovakia early in July made statements endorsing the CPSU line. *and a similar one by Gomulka at that time*
NE Their statements were sufficiently satisfactory to the CPSU for publication in Pravda (8 July).

55. The Mongolian Party on 4 July and the Albanian Party on the 11th adopted resolutions which clearly failed to satisfy the CPSU, and they

were ignored by the Soviet press in a 20 July roundup. The CPSU evidently exerted pressure on these two parties, for on 14 August the Mongolian party publication finally presented a vigorous criticism of "dogmatists" and aligned itself with the CPSU, ^{and} while on 2 August, ^{and} Enver Hoxha of Albania spoke in support of the Soviet view on war and the desirability of peaceful coexistence. He did not, however, retreat from the Albanian party's firm insistence that right revisionism remains the main danger to the Communist movement, ^{and} in fact the Albanian CP is clearly on the Chinese side in the dispute.

56. The North Vietnamese Party at the outset indicated that it wished to remain neutral in the dispute and ^{has} continued to do so despite evidence of Soviet pressure. In private conversation in September, Ho Chi Minh ^{M N} reportedly stated that he was determined to remain neutral. He considered it important that an agreement between Mao and Khrushchev was important before the November meeting in Moscow, but he feared that neither would give in. On the questions of "transition" and Chinese policy toward India, Ho appeared to support the Chinese views.

57. In addition to the adoption of formal positions on the dispute, "explanatory" programs were observed in some Bloc countries.

58. Following a conference reportedly held at Varna among Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, Czech, and Rumanian representatives in the last week

in July, the Bulgarian party leadership discussed the launching of a "mass explanation" within the party in order to explain and justify what was described a feeling of "general tension bordering on panic" as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

59. The East German party also launched a briefing campaign at the same time. Lower cadres were briefed on the basis of extracts from the report of an SED delegate to Bucharest. An attempt was made to create the impression that the dispute involved practical matters, rather than basic policy considerations.

60. In both the Bulgarian and East German parties, it seems that Party officials were told to watch out for manifestations of deviations similar to the Chinese, and "nationalist" deviations figured in the anti-Chinese effort in both countries.